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**How Successfully did British Intelligence Monitor the Threat from
Nazi Germany Before the Outbreak of World War Two?**

Essay prepared for Mister Edward D. R. Harrison

British Intelligence in the Second World War

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INTRODUCTION

It can be said that the principal task of an intelligence service is to provide accurate information about any threat to its government's national security. This essay will focus on a specific government facing a specific threat during a specific period of our history. By looking at how successfully British intelligence monitored the threat from Nazi Germany before the outbreak of World War Two, I intend to assess the quality of the information provided by military intelligence to British leadership before the beginning of the war. Retrospectively, we can conclude that Britain knew that a war was coming but that she didn't know exactly when nor how it was going to start. Therefore by 1936, the principal interest of British intelligence was Adolf Hitler's plans and intentions. The British policy of appeasement of the 1930s was obviously not working in front of an extremist dictator¹ and British military intelligence therefore had to monitor as closely as possible the threat posed by the new Nazi regime and more specifically by the development of its armed forces.

In addition to giving the reader an overview of British military intelligence assessment of the growing threat from Nazi Germany in the 1930s, this essay will try to demonstrate that the intelligence community was suffering from severe weaknesses – mainly technical – and that when these weaknesses could be overcome, preconceptions and over-confidence of British leaders made them ignore warnings of a developing threat.²

This essay is about military intelligence and is structured around the three branches of the British armed forces – air, ground and naval – in order to reflect the intelligence assessment of each of these units. Although a commendable effort to centralize and coordinate intelligence was achieved with the creation of the Joint Intelligence Committee

¹ British leaders convinced themselves, during most of the 1930s, that Adolf Hitler was a bizarre but still moderate leader who would eventually agree to a European-wide settlement. See Williamson Murray, 'Appeasement and Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 2, no. 4, October 1987, pp. 48-53 and 58.

² See Robert Cecil, 'C's War', *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 1, no. 2, May 1986, p. 173.

(JIC)³, it only came after the threat from Germany became obvious to all. Therefore, emphasis will be put on departmental intelligence branches: the Air Intelligence section 3(b) or AI3(b), the Military Intelligence section 3(b) or MI3(b), and the Naval Intelligence Division or NID. As of the services under the Foreign Office⁴ and the other occasional sources of intelligence, reference to them will be made in relation with the intelligence assessments of the three branches of the armed forces. The conclusion will then assess the success of British intelligence as a whole.

The assessment of these military intelligence services' monitoring efforts will be made on the basis of their success or failure to correctly appraise German rearmament, expansion and intentions. A successful intelligence estimate is considered to be an estimate giving information close to the reality – based on today's knowledge – and in a timely manner. As of the period of time covered, it will be the one starting in 1933 when Adolf Hitler, leader of the Nationalist Socialist German Worker's (Nazi) Party, became German chancellor (30 January) to 1939 when Britain declared war on Germany (3 September).

1. THE THREAT FROM THE AIR

After World War One and because of the severe limitations of the Versailles Treaty, the German armed forces were virtually nonexistent and were definitely not a threat to anyone. This was particularly true for the air force since the Germans were completely forbidden to possess such a weapon. The only existing air power was a 'tiny clandestine

³ The JIC replaced the Inter-Service Intelligence Committee (ISIC) six months after its creation in January 1936.

⁴ Namely the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS). However, since SIS was relegated to the peripheries of the British intelligence community because of its overall inefficiency during the 1930s, and because of the limited length of this essay, SIS' role will not be assessed here. See Ralph Bennett, *Behind the Battle: Intelligence in the War with Germany, 1939-1945*, London, Pimlico, 1999, pp. 25-26 and Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939*, London, I.B. Tauris & Co., 1985, p.21.

affair’⁵ and there was indeed nothing much to monitor before 1934. But the remarkable German industrial capacity was known to the British and although, when Hitler became chancellor, the Luftwaffe (German air force) only existed on paper, the British Air Ministry was quick to set up intelligence requirements on the development of the German air power. The British believed in a more conservative pace in rearmament⁶ and did not, at first, believe in the existence of the Luftwaffe itself. But rapidly, fear among government officials and the public of German bombers reaching Britain and flattening entire cities put the monitoring of German air power at the top of the list of British priorities throughout the 1930s.

The intelligence service responsible for the monitoring of German air force development was the section 3(b) of the Air Intelligence (AI) directorate. And soon did it focus on the greatest of its fears, the ‘worst case scenario’: a German knockout blow against Britain. The air staff clearly overestimated the striking power of the Luftwaffe and seems to have been driven by its fears more than by a rational analysis of German capabilities. Gross exaggerations in unrealistic – almost fantasist – capabilities led British policy-makers to setup expansion plans for the Royal Air Force (RAF) ‘designed to match the changing predictions of German growth.’⁷ Intelligence from AI was flawed from the beginning and even when ‘understanding of German air doctrine was somewhat broadened by new intelligence in the latter stages of the 1930s, the suppositions that the Germans would use their bombers for a knockout blow was never called into doubt.’⁸

The German Luftwaffe simply did not have the technical capabilities to undertake such a mission. The AI failed to identify the technical characteristics of German aircrafts which would have revealed that the Heinkel-111 could barely reach the British Midlands from

⁵ Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy*, *supra* note 4, p. 18.

⁶ See Donald Cameron Watt, ‘British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe’, in Ernest R. May (ed.), *Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 256-257.

⁷ Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy*, *supra* note 4, p. 57.

⁸ *Id.*, p. 36. See also p. 76.

German bases and that the Dornier's range would cover London but not more. The Germans obviously knew their limitations and the Luftwaffe staff even wrote, in February 1939, that 'an air offensive against Britain, in addition to running the risk of provoking retaliation against targets in western Germany, would impede the launching of a land offensive by severely restricting the supplies of aviation fuel and munitions available to support ground operations.'⁹ Such a document would have been of great help in diminishing British irrational fears but one could argue that strong preconceived ideas might as well have made British leaders reject that intelligence as disinformation.¹⁰

If the fearful AI was unable to read the real German intentions regarding her use of the Luftwaffe, it was however more accurate in monitoring the numerical strength of it. In February 1934, AI accurately reported the increase of military aircrafts built or being built in violation of the Versailles Treaty. At that date, 338 planes were ready to fly or in construction, twice as much as a year before.¹¹ A clear and accurate estimate of the number of aircrafts was a great achievement for the AI but at the same time, it failed to predict the expansion of the Luftwaffe just as it failed to foresee German intentions.

The failure to impose itself, the claim largely accepted by the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, Parliament, and public opinion that the Luftwaffe had achieved parity with the RAF in March 1935, and the estimates on the still-secret Luftwaffe produced by the Chiefs of Naval Staff and the Imperial General Staff greatly undermined AI's credibility and morale.¹² In addition to the inherently difficult task of monitoring air force build-up, these factors certainly played a role in the exaggerated and flawed reports on the Luftwaffe's objectives.

⁹ Donald Cameron Watt, 'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe', *supra* note 6, p. 259.

¹⁰ '[B]ecause the Air Ministry was dominated by the doctrine of the strategic deterrent, and because intelligence was subordinated to operations and planning, intelligence which did not conform to the dominant doctrine was excluded.' *Id.*, p. 267.

¹¹ See Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy*, *supra* note 4, p. 37.

¹² See Donald Cameron Watt, 'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe', *supra* note 6, p. 255.

As a whole, intelligence on German air force during the 1930s was victim of British preconceived ideas and visceral fears. They sincerely thought that the greatest threat was going to come from the air and that Britain was going to be the prime target in Hitler's strategy of a quickly fought and quickly won war. But in fact 'hard intelligence indicated that the Germans had virtually nothing on their western frontier, were facing serious economic difficulties, and had concentrated nearly all of the Luftwaffe to handle the Czechs.'¹³ AI was successful in its assessment of the air force already deployed but, unable to 'distinguish between bureaucratic and national politics'¹⁴ and driven by fantasists fears, it failed to make any accurate prediction on the *real* threat from the air.

2. MI3 AND THE GERMAN GROUND FORCES

The German army was also greatly restricted by the diktats of the post-World War One Versailles Treaty. Tanks and heavy artillery were forbidden, only a limited amount of mechanized artillery was allowed to be deployed, and ground forces were limited to a hundred thousand men.¹⁵ Clear consensus does not seem to exist in military history literature as whether British intelligence was aware of the reconstruction of the Wehrmacht before Hitler's rise to power. However, it seems more probable that British military intelligence was in fact paying great attention to the evolution of German mechanized forces and doctrines for their use.¹⁶ The quality of British assessment of that evolution is another question. Because although MI3 – the Military Intelligence directorate whose section 3(b) was responsible for monitoring Germany – provided timely and accurate information on the German order of

¹³ Williamson Murray, 'Appeasement and Intelligence', *supra* note 1, p. 58.

¹⁴ Donald Cameron Watt, 'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe', *supra* note 6, p. 269.

¹⁵ See Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy*, *supra* note 4, p. 18 and J. P. Harris, 'British Military Intelligence and the Rise of German Mechanized Forces, 1929-40', *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 6, no. 2, April 1991, p. 397.

¹⁶ J. P. Harris, 'British Military Intelligence and the Rise of German Mechanized Forces, 1929-40', *supra* note 15 p. 395.

battle, it was less efficient in determining the location of German ground forces and failed in predicting German military strategy, including the Blitzkrieg doctrine.¹⁷

The first element of concern was the flow of information reaching the War Office since 1924 about the allegedly deep interest of Germany in mechanized ground forces. It would be unfair to state that MI3 did not predict the development of German tanks and armoured vehicles since it was aware, in the early 1930s, of illegal German experiments with tanks, whether in Germany or on foreign soil. MI3 accurately reported that tanks in Germany were not present in any large numbers, reinforcing the theory of experiments abroad. Therefore, it rapidly became clear to British intelligence that the Germans were intending to develop what was going to be known as the Panzer divisions, the first three of which were to be established in October 1935.¹⁸ Their existence was immediately known to the British since no attempt was made to conceal their creation. Also, 'MI3 correctly identified their main elements as being a tank brigade of two tank regiments, each of two battalions, a mechanized infantry brigade, an anti-tank battalion and a divisional artillery group.'¹⁹ As of German heavy tanks, no specific information was acquired by MI3 for the simple reason that no such tanks existed since Germany was prioritizing speed over armour. Major General Sir Kenneth Strong was entirely right to predict that in order to execute the decisive manoeuvres for which they were intended 'the tanks in the armoured divisions must be built primarily for *speed*'.²⁰ The overall picture of German mechanized forces and especially its development of tank divisions was therefore generally good although MI3 did not take into account the shortage of money, fuel and industrial capacity and fuel which impaired the replacement of horses by mechanized means.

¹⁷ See Donald Cameron Watt, 'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe', *supra* note 6, p. 254.

¹⁸ J. P. Harris, 'British Military Intelligence and the Rise of German Mechanized Forces, 1929-40', *supra* note 15, p. 402.

¹⁹ *Id.*, p. 404.

²⁰ *Id.*, p. 409.

However, despite the intense suspicion that prevailed during the interwar period, MI3 failed to correctly estimate the number of vehicles at least until 1938 when its estimates became more precise. In October 1936, an MI3 detailed note²¹ contained an important number of inaccuracies: ‘The Panzer division never had the three Panzer regiments with which they were credited here. Two was their maximum strength. And each regiment had only two battalions not the three apiece indicated. It seems most improbable that the Germans ever intended to give each Panzer division the 1,000 tanks which seem to be anticipated in this document. Three hundred and twenty-four tanks was the maximum any division had in the Ardennes thrust of 1940.’²² But by the beginning of 1938, the quality of MI3’s estimates increased and became more precise, making the War Office realize that the Panzer divisions were of smaller size than predicted. An example of this increased accuracy came in September 1938 when the MI3’s estimates established the existence of ‘36 infantry divisions, 15 reserve divisions, and 21 to 24 Landwehr divisions, that is, 79 divisions in all, an overall error of only four divisions.’²³ It also correctly estimated the number of Panzer divisions: in 1939, six Panzer divisions were in place with a seventh in the process of formation.²⁴

To reach these conclusions, British military intelligence relied on a variety of sources. The particularity of intelligence-gathering in peacetime is that a great amount of information can be obtained through open sources. In the 1930s, information reaching MI3 was mainly coming from reports of military attachés²⁵ and from German military publications. The German press was also a source of intelligence and it has even been argued that ‘the vast majority of British information on the German Army at this period was gathered from open

²¹ The note bore the title ‘Note On The Composition Of A German Armoured Division And An Estimate Of Approximate Number Of Vehicles Which It May Eventually Have’.

²² J. P. Harris, ‘British Military Intelligence and the Rise of German Mechanized Forces, 1929-40’, *supra* note 15, pp. 404-405.

²³ Donald Cameron Watt, ‘British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe’, *supra* note 6, p. 254.

²⁴ J. P. Harris, ‘British Military Intelligence and the Rise of German Mechanized Forces, 1929-40’, *supra* note 15, p. 407.

²⁵ It is important to note that military attachés were sometimes gathering intelligence secretly and that therefore, their reports were not always based solely on open sources.

sources.’²⁶ In fact, open sources appeared to be generally more reliable than secret sources, like in the case of the MI3 note of October 1936 mentioned earlier. Espionage was the principal source of information used in the production of that flawed assessment of German Panzer divisions. But as stated by Dr J.P. Harris, ‘Open sources inevitably had their limitations. MI3 never achieved much accuracy with regard to such matters as the technical details of tanks, rates of tank production or numbers of tanks held by the German Army. [...] But the MI3 analysts were generally professional enough to realize the limitations of their sources.’²⁷

Finally, it is worth saying a few words about the blitzkrieg²⁸ doctrine, an illustration of the overall quality of MI3’s assessment of German ground forces which was flawed and inexact before 1938 but became more precise and more accurate during the twenty months preceding the outbreak of the war. The blitzkrieg was not a well-defined strategy created by the German military strategists and premeditated during the 1930s. In fact, it developed rather slowly and imprecisely shortly before September 1939 and therefore, British military intelligence could not realistically foresee such an innovation. However, MI3 did identify accurately in 1938 ‘the elements of what was to become Germany’s blitzkrieg method – the triad or armoured spearhead, speed of advance, and air support.’²⁹ The British knew about the development of armoured vehicles, about the emphasis put on the rapidity of movement, and about the important role to be played by the Luftwaffe.³⁰ All that was missing was the link between these three elements: the blitzkrieg doctrine.

²⁶ J. P. Harris, ‘British Military Intelligence and the Rise of German Mechanized Forces, 1929-40’, *supra* note 15, p. 396.

²⁷ *Id.*, pp. 404-405.

²⁸ ‘The term ‘Blitzkrieg’ was not current in any branch of the German armed forces in the inter-war period, the Germans apparently having picked it up from the foreign press during the course of the Second World War.’ *Id.*, p. 400.

²⁹ Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy*, *supra* note 4, p. 97.

³⁰ See J. P. Harris, ‘British Military Intelligence and the Rise of German Mechanized Forces, 1929-40’, *supra* note 15, p. 403.

In conclusion, as of the monitoring of German ground forces, we can conclude that MI3 performed well but took quite some time in reaching accuracy in its estimates. Thanks to MI3, the British were aware of the operational techniques employed by the Germans but the intelligence service provided only little technical information on German tanks mainly because such information would have required the use of clandestine intelligence-gathering. The War Office also failed to predict the development of the blitzkrieg doctrine and therefore took no step in advance to counter such a military strategy.³¹

3. THE GERMAN NAVY

The monitoring of the German Navy by British military intelligence in the 1930s was similar to the task of monitoring of the two other branches of the military in the sense that, as Professor Wark rightly points it, the German navy ‘consisted of a few small surface ships and some harmless prewar dreadnoughts.’³² However, a distinction laid in the fact that Britain and Germany signed an agreement on 18 June 1935 allowing the Germans to build a fleet up to 35 per cent of the strength of the Royal Navy. This was clearly opening the door for an easier illegal navy build-up since the Versailles Treaty would have otherwise restricted the Germans even more. The bilateral treaty, as we know now, was used by Berlin to speed up the reconstruction of its navy and it seems clear that British overconfidence and misinterpretation made London believe too easily ‘German statements that the new German navy would not be built against Britain and that Germany realized the futility of a naval war, a repetition of World War I, against the West.’³³ Therefore, German naval build-up was not a secret. What was unknown was the real size, rate and technical details of that reconstruction, a reality that the Naval Intelligence Division (NID) was charged to discover.

³¹ See Ralph Bennett, *Behind the Battle*, *supra* note 4, p. 16.

³² Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy*, *supra* note 4, p. 18.

³³ *Id.*, p. 145.

The Admiralty gulped the preconceived idea according to which Britain and Germany, after the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (AGNA) of June 1935, were on the path of peaceful relations. But hopefully, and despite some shortcomings in its assessments, the NID saved the day by entertaining a constant level of suspicion towards information provided by the Germans under the AGNA and concerning their naval fleet. Some authors seem to easily depict the work of NID as flawed and inaccurate but it seems that as a matter of fact, its estimates of post-AGNA German naval strength were reasonably accurate. Donald C. Watt however underlines a major exception: the submarine strength. '[T]he Admiralty allowed for a more rapid rate of completion than German shipyards were able to achieve. [...] Where the German navy was concerned, the principal weakness in Admiralty information appears to have lain in the failure properly to appreciate the threat to British convoy practice which would result from the German combination of heavy ships and submarines.'³⁴

But NID analysts performed generally well in regards to technical assessment of the German fleet. One could argue that their good performance was greatly attributable to an agent in the drawing office of one of the largest German naval construction yards, the Germaniawerk at Kiel.³⁵ In fact, they made use of both covert and overt sources and as in the case of MI3, open sources were usually perceived as more reliable than covert ones. In addition, '[t]he international system of reciprocal visits to warships and naval installations by naval attachés, and courtesy visits by warships to foreign ports, presented opportunities for visual inspection.'³⁶

Generally, the NID was gathering reliable intelligence on the development of the German navy and it was successful in correctly concluding that the Germans were prioritizing

³⁴ Donald Cameron Watt, 'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe', *supra* note 6, p. 260.

³⁵ *Id.*, p. 269, referring to Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, London, Collins, 1968-1976, vol. 2, p. 356, note 2.

³⁶ Joseph A. Maiolo, '“I believe the Hun is cheating”: British Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936-39', *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 11, no. 1, January 1996, p. 34.

quantity over quality. Mass production of U-boats meant that the navy had to rely on existing yet tough and reliable designs. Where the NID failed was in the prediction of the German innovative tactical approach to war at sea in which a great number of aggressive U-boats would be used to attack British convoys in the Atlantic and undermine the efficiency of the Royal Navy. Professor Wark also notes that the Admiralty failed ‘to integrate German naval construction into the broader picture of German rearmament or to consider the impact of the German navy as a consumer competing for scarce raw materials and skilled labor.’³⁷

As of the German submarines, NID was clearly suspecting the Germans to cheat on the treaty but the danger was that they might cheat on numbers rather than on the weight of individual submarines. ‘Thanks to Otto Krüger, the former German naval officer turned SIS informant in 1919, this was not initially a major anxiety. [...] His steady supply of reliable intelligence on IvS [*Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepbouw*] and later as a consulting engineer at Kiel served to authenticate the claims of the official German U-boat programme.’³⁸

We can conclude that technical assessment of the German navy by British intelligence performed well despite during the second half of the 1930s. NID was not flawless but its failures were more at a tactical level and did not derive from misconceptions created by German cheating or by a lack of reliable intelligence.

CONCLUSION

British military intelligence in the 1930s performed generally well in monitoring the then existing threat from Nazi Germany but often failed to correctly predict intentions, developments and strategies. The lack of coordination between the three intelligence branches of the armed forces and the endemic tendency to assess the Germans with biased British eyes

³⁷ Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy*, *supra* note 4, p. 153.

³⁸ Joseph A. Maiolo, ‘I believe the Hun is cheating’, *supra* note 36, p. 47.

made British policy-makers fail to address the real threat they had to deal with in the late 1930s.³⁹ This essay focused on the monitoring efforts of British military intelligence and it is obvious that a complete picture cannot be obtained otherwise than by also assessing how other services monitored the threat from Nazi Germany, especially the secret organizations, in fields like political⁴⁰ and economic intelligence.

³⁹ Williamson Murray, 'Appeasement and Intelligence', *supra* note 1, p. 53.

⁴⁰ See Appendix.

APPENDIX

Apart from strict military intelligence, political intelligence was also of great importance during the 1930s. On 23 August 1939, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov signed the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact while French, British and Soviets were still talking of a potential alliance. Warnings of that rapprochement were given to and received by British leadership but they were not believed and rapidly discarded. Below is an interesting example of one of these ‘warnings’ which could have prevented the disastrous intelligence failure to anticipate the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

[transcription of the original newspaper clipping]

Britain’s Risk in Ignoring Russia

by Vernon Bartlett

The Diplomatic Correspondent

How little the present British Government is interested in assuring the support of Russia in the event of another European war is shown by information I have received to supplement the article I wrote on Saturday about the danger of a Russo-German understanding.

It is stated in Russian quarters that except at social functions, the Ambassador has only once seen Lord Halifax in three and a half months. That was on Friday last, when, at his own request, he called on the Foreign Secretary to explain the Russian view about a Swedish – Finnish proposal to fortify the Aaland Islands.

What Soviet Could Do

The previous interview, on October 11, was also at the Ambassador’s request, as he had to protest against Lord Winterton’s allegations about Soviet policy.

On each of these occasions – October 11 and January 27 – there was some general discussion of the European situation, but the failure to consult or even to inform Russia about Mr. Chamberlain’s discussions in Paris or Rome must go a long way to confirm the suspicions of those who claim that the present British Government would rather see the defeat of the Empire than its victory with Russian help.

For even if the worst stories of the effects of the military purges were true it would still be the fact that an army mobilised along the western border of Russia would immobilise very many divisions in Eastern Germany.

When Mr. Eden visited Moscow in 1935 and arrangements for Anglo-Russian diplomatic contacts were made. It has fallen into disuse since the change in British foreign policy. And it is significant that the initiative for the new Russo-German and Russo-Polish trade talks came from Berlin and Warsaw and not from Moscow.

Making Best Terms

In other words, Herr Hitler, despite his attacks on Bolshevism, is not going to lose so splendid an opportunity for destroying the possibility of simultaneous military pressure against his Western and Eastern frontiers.

The Russians claim that their policy has always been one of friendship towards any Government whose policy towards them was peaceful, and instance as an example their relations with Italy from 1924 to 1935. The policy changed in 1935 because Italy went to war against Abyssinia and Anglo-French toleration of aggression in Abyssinia and Spain had not then nullified the obligations of the League Covenant.

The Soviet Government no longer appears to feel the slightest obligation to help Great Britain and France should they be in trouble with Germany and Italy, and it is out to make the best possible terms with its neighbours as long as they will leave Russia in peace.

There is, in its view, not enough difference between the attitudes of the British and French Governments on the one hand, and the German and Italian on the other to justify grave sacrifices to help the Western democracies.

Food Supplies

Although the Russo-German negotiations, due to begin in a few days, are supposed to deal only with trade matters – and they will be facilitated by the present campaign in certain quarters in England for the abrogation of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement of 1934 – it is clear that negotiations to assure Germany inexhaustible supplies of food in the event of war also have their political importance.

It would be extremely unwise to believe that the existing antipathy between Moscow and Berlin is necessarily an unalterable factor in international politics.

Vernon Bartlett, ‘Britain’s Risk in Ignoring Russia’, *News Chronicle*, 30 January 1939, p. 2.

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