

The New Intelligence Order: Knowledge for Security and International Relations

Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies

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The View from Ottawa

Richard Fadden

Al Qaeda is not the only source of terror and we should not ignore other threats, like drugs and international crime.

Canada does not have an Office of National Assessment but the Privy Council Office intelligence secretariats have been expanded.

There are other means to enhance Canadian foreign intelligence than the creation of a foreign intelligence agency, such as enhancing the role of CSIS in that domain.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was a turning point but the attacks of September 11, 2001, was a return to a division of the world like before 1989.

Religious extremism dehumanises like Marxism used to do.

The challenge is to find a balance between collective security and individual rights.

In Canada lies the danger of sleepers who could eventually undertake one extraordinary, highly damageable attack.

Another challenge is to defeat terrorism instead of simply defeating terrorists. We should not consider the death of terrorists as the end of terrorism. The war on terrorism will fail if we focus only on terrorists; it will only succeed if we destroy both the terrorists and the deepest causes of terrorism.

If the imagination of terrorists has no limits, then our imagination should have no limits as well.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the size of the security and intelligence community, but should also bring more agencies into the counter-terrorism effort. The security and intelligence community needs to deal with more than just intelligence and security matters.

September 27, 2003

Canadian Perspectives on Intelligence Studies

Anthony Campbell

The reason why there has been so little change since the attacks of September 11, 2001, is that Canada has a low I.Q.: it has to learn. Canada has the lowest level of knowledge, meaning the lowest level of awareness within the government, low budget for the security and intelligence community, etc.

We need clusters and CASIS is an effort made to cluster institutions.

We do not have adequate institutions with the ability, experience and knowledge needed for the teaching of intelligence.

Training Analysts: The Intelligence Device Supreme

Roy Weise

The age of analysis has replaced the age of collection. While spies steal secrets, analysts unravel puzzles and mysteries.

A Swede compared the evolution of intelligence to that of medicine: it was first performed by amateurs in times of emergency, and then became more and more rigorous.

Teaching Intelligence at Military Institutions

Roger George

Officials, and not only the public, are ill-informed about intelligence.

Expectations from intelligence are typically much too high.

Distinguished Guest Speaker

Margaret Bloodworth

It is important to learn from lessons from the past.

Canada does not have a British- or American-type of intelligence culture.

First, intelligence has to produce added value, unique value; open sources are important as they provide for a context to secret sources.

Second, intelligence has to be user-friendly and its reliability has to be obvious for the consumer.

Third, intelligence also has to be timely, especially for decision-making.

Fourth, up-to-date technology and skills are vital to insure relevance.

Fifth, we have to leverage our strengths in order to share with allies and get an interesting part of their intelligence. Smaller is not necessarily bad, especially since smaller institutions can mean easier co-ordination and collaboration, which have improved since the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Sixth, we must challenge conventional wisdom by thinking outside the box, avoiding biases, preconceived ideas and stereotypes, and by accepting to question ourselves. This could be the perfect role for academics to play.

Seventh, intelligence has to be client-focused, not client-driven. There should be a sharp awareness of the clients' needs, just like in a regular business.

These seven points could be mentioned for the benefit of other government agencies with the same relevance. These points are not only important for the security and intelligence community but for the security of the country.

The security and intelligence community is doing a good job but let's be careful not to be complacent.

Israeli Intelligence Community and Counter-Terrorism

Yigal Sheffy

The intelligence as an early warning for war (and not terrorism, which was secondary) has been replaced by the intelligence for peace focusing on the terrorism threat, after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994.

In 2002, the first priority of Israeli defence and intelligence is terrorism.

The Mossad remains on the offensive but also has a huge role in counter-terrorism liaison with other countries' agencies.

Israel uses a "small circle" system in its counter-terrorism operations: intelligence officers communicate directly with counter-terrorism field operators (where in "large circle" systems, there is a "buffer", an intermediate between them).

US Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism

Greg Treverton

Terrorism is an old world problem in a new world order.

The Cold War legacy is a centralised analysis capability (mainly within CIA) and a compartmentalised collection capability (HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.). That structure is not relevant anymore.

The United States should reorganise its intelligence assets in the light of these principles: distributed networks (analysts, collectors, consumers), information (not only secret) business,

and breakdown of the wall between intelligence and policy (so intelligence can be relevant to policy makers).

The failure of September 11, 2001, happened in part because the Federal Aviation Administration, which is not part of the law enforcement community, was not told about the two hijackers known by the CIA since about August 2001. It also happened in part because airline companies, which are private and not public institutions, were not told about these hijackers. This lack of collaboration underscores the need to share.

During the war in Afghanistan, Special Forces were used as sensors and not as shooters.

The United States is now sharing intelligence with countries that could have been targets a year and a half ago or that are still potential targets today.

Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism in a Multi-Centric World

Ronald Crelinsten

The multi-centric world is characterised by deterritorialised threats, the importance of non-state actors, globalisation (technological, cultural, etc.), merging and blurring of policy domain, and challenges to state sovereignty.

Security needed in a multi-centric world: traditional threats, proliferation, wars, transformed threats, military and political but also social, economic and environmental issues.

We need to share across borders but also across jurisdictions. Co-ordination is needed between domestic and foreign intelligence, and between security and criminal intelligence.

A counter-terrorism strategy must be multi-pronged, multi-faceted and multi-jurisdictional.

A multi-centric world opposes certain vulnerabilities with uncertain threats, short term with long term, hard power with soft power, tactical with strategic.

Intelligence, Security and the Integration of Law Enforcement

Giuliano Zaccardelli

Greater integration is absolutely essential, but what is integration?

We cannot accept overlapping and duplication.

Integration has been enhanced since the attacks of September 11, 2001. For example, we have established the Canada-USA Smart Border Agreement, the Integrated National Security Enforcement teams (INSET, a cross-agency and cross-border organisation) and the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET, a multi-agency law enforcement team targeting cross-border crime), and Bill C-36 (the Anti-terrorism Act) now facilitates investigative work.

Integration is not easy but is essential. It presents many challenges: (1) we must enhance our existing network, (2) we must increase the interoperability between organisations, such as between domestic and foreign intelligence, (3) we must focus our resources to meet our future needs and be more strategic in that use, (4) we must break the mental blocks within the law enforcement and intelligence cultures, just like Apollo 13 crew had to come up with new, never-seen solutions when facing completely new problems they had never encountered, and (5) we must build public confidence, which is a prerequisite for success, by enhancing public education in security and intelligence matters.

What we have to do is: (1) develop shared priorities, domestically and internationally, (2) focus on the free flow of intelligence, (3) implement interoperable systems working across agencies, across borders, etc., (4) lever economies of scale, making the most of our money, and (5) insure efficiency by eliminating duplications.

Integration simply means working together.

If we rely on the structure (number of organisations, their name, etc.), we are doomed to fail. Our success depends on our behaviour.

Democracy and Counter-Terrorism: Policy and Practice Past and Present **David Charters**

A balance between national security and civil liberties is needed.

International co-operation is important but its limits make unilateral actions more likely to be undertaken but unilateral actions are usually more damageable than effective.

Terrorists act in secret and therefore, to be effective, counter-terrorism tactics must be intrusive; there lies the challenge to human rights.

The military is not effective against small, mobile units that are hiding within civilian communities by blending into the crowds.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the American response undermined Al Qaeda's legitimacy but extending the war into Iraq might reverse that and bring back support to groups like Al Qaeda.

Striking the Right Balance: National Reactions to Security Threats - What History Teaches **Allan Kagedan**

Counter-communism and counter-terrorism are somehow similar as they are both domestic and foreign at the same time.

Comparison made with the Soviet presence in Canada in the 1940s.

Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism: The Changing World of Contemporary Terrorism and Intelligence Failures

Arpad Palfy

Intelligence has a support role and is not a crystal ball.

We can ask ourselves whether the attacks of September 11, 2001, were an intelligence failure or a surprise attack.

Intelligence does not predict future events but simply presents possibilities.

Intelligence Capabilities

Greg Fyffe

There is no need for a Canadian foreign intelligence service, since countries establish foreign services only we faced with a compelling need. Canada has not reached that threshold.

Revisiting the Intelligence Failure of the Yom Kippur War

Uri Bar-Joseph

Denial and reinterpretation of inconsistent information to match one's prior conception.

Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Programme

Kurt Jensen

The Foreign Intelligence Interview Programme was created in 1953 as part of the Joint Intelligence Bureau. Its aim was to debrief ordinary people (immigrants, Canadian travellers, etc.). It was kept low profile and its objective was to obtain information from so-called denied areas. It mainly filled the gaps using these interviews as open sources of intelligence. The information gathered mainly concerned political, economic, social, technological and scientific issues.

In 1979, there was a broadening of targets to include non-communist countries. The response from the interviewees was very good.

In 1985, the Foreign Intelligence Bureau was created.

After the fall of communism in 1989, the Programme's priorities had to be reoriented.

Should there be a Canadian foreign intelligence service within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade? The answer lies in a second question, that is: what would it provide us that we don't have access to right now?

September 28, 2003

The Gouzenko Affair Revisited **Amy Knight**

Soviet military intelligence (GRU) task in Ottawa was to gather intelligence on atomic research.

The GRU team in Ottawa was enjoying “free life” in Ottawa with a lot of parties on the agenda.

Wives and NKVD agents (led by Vitali Pavlov) sent from Moscow brought some rigor to the GRU team in Ottawa.

In 1944, suspicions arise as to the possibility of Gouzenko defecting.

When Gouzenko heard of the possibility for him to be recalled to Moscow, he decided to defect (one year before his actual defection).

Kim Philby, in England, confirmed to Moscow the defection of Gouzenko.

Our Men in Havana: Washington and Canadian Intelligence on Castro's Cuba **Don Munton**

The three phases of Canadian involvement in Cuba have been: (1) sharing information (informal, diplomatic, etc.), (2) providing reports (regular basis; for the Americans who had closed their embassy; on request; the British had also accepted to collaborate with the Americans), and (3) undertaking task of intelligence gathering (information on the fact that the opposition forces to Castro before the Bay of Pigs invasion were weak and that there was a broad, popular support for Castro; information on the departure of Russian forces and equipment at the end of the Cuban missile crisis).

There is a strong possibility that the Cubans knew about Canadian intelligence gathering in Cuba but did nothing because (1) Canadians were in fact spying on Soviets and (2) Canada was allowing the Cuban consulates in Toronto and Montreal to remain open.

The Evolution of German Intelligence Since 1990 **Wolfgang Krieger**

The BND was founded in 1956 by Reinhard Gehlen.

It survived the end of the Cold War and even got out stronger of the transformation period.

The BND suffered a period of neglect in 1982 under Helmut Kohl.

There was a period of illusory eternal peace in 1989.

The BND has never declassified a single sheet of paper since its creation in 1956.

The BND has decided to put up a sign with its name at the entrance of its headquarters and became more open towards the media.

In 1990, the BND Act gave the Parliament some oversight mandate.

The development of the European Union and of a European Security policy called, in 1999, for the establishment by Germany of a General Command (formerly under NATO) and, therefore, of an intelligence component.

The BND moved its analysis branch from the outskirts of Munich into Berlin and the entire organisation might follow.

The Persistence of the Counterintelligence State: Implications for the War on Terrorism

John Schindler

A counterintelligence state is a state that depends on secret police to survive through: (1) the use of spymania (mainly xenophobic), (2) the intimidation by secret police, (3) the pervasive penetration of society, and (4) widespread state corruption.

Examples of counterintelligence states are the USSR (past), Serbia and Yugoslavia (today), North Korea (today, with its Stalinist regime) and Iraq (today). Examples of states that are not completely counterintelligence ones include China and Cuba.